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DOES FAILURE TO MITIGATE DAMAGES BAR
RECOVERY OF THE COSTS OF MITIGATION?
Gregory Crespi*

ABSTRACT

It is well established that a person who makes reasonableefforts to
mitigate her damages after a breach of contract will be able to recover
the costs of those mitigation efforts as incidental damages, and that a
person who fails to make such efforts will be denied recovery of the
damages that could have been avoided. But will a person who fails to
take reasonable efforts to mitigate damages still be able to recover the
probable cost of those mitigation efforts as an offset against the
reduction in her damagesfor failure to mitigate, even though she did not
incur those costs? The conventional wisdom amongjudges and scholars
is that mitigation costs that were not incurredby an injuredperson are
not recoverable as an offset or otherwise. In my opinion, however, this
conclusion is not justified as a matter of social policy, and arguably is
also not requiredas a matter ofpositive law, at least under common law
if not also under Article 2 of the Uniform CommercialCode ("U.C.C. ').
In this Article, Ifirst consider the proper resolution of this question
as a matter ofpolicy. I then review the applicable law, first with regard
to sale of goods contracts governed by state statutes implementing
Article 2 of the U.C.C., and then with regard to contracts governed
primarily by general common law principles as articulated in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. I will draw an analytical distinction
between "primary" efforts made to mitigate the damages resultingfrom
a contract breach, and "secondary" financing-type mitigation efforts
intended to avoid the risk offurther consequential losses that may result
from the cash shortfall caused by non-avoidable lossesfrom breach until
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they are reimbursed I also consider the significance of the presence of
applicableprejudgment interest statutesfor this question.
I conclude on the basis of both fairness concerns and efficiency
considerationsthat the probable costs of mitigation efforts that are not
undertaken should as a matter of policy still be recoverable as an offset
against any reduction in damages for failure to mitigate. I also
conclude, however, that as a matter ofpositive law both the common law
and U C.C. Article 2 are unclear as to whether the recovery ofprobable
mitigation costs that are not incurred is allowed, particularly the
U. C.C., andparticularlywith regardto secondary mitigationefforts.
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is well established that if a person injured by a breach of contract
has the opportunity to mitigate her damages without thereby bearing
undue risk, burden, or humiliation, but does not do so, then that person
will be denied recovery of those damages that she could have so
avoided.1 It is also well established that a person may as a general matter
recover the cost of reasonable mitigation efforts, along with her other
recoverable losses.2 The law is also clear that if a person makes
reasonable efforts to mitigate damages, but those efforts prove to be
unsuccessful, she still is entitled as a general matter to recover the cost
of those mitigation efforts.3
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981). This
is of course in the absence of any agreement by the parties to remove the burden from the injured
party of having to mitigate damages to avoid a reduction in recovery.
2. Id. § 347(b) & cmt. c. This is again in the absence of any agreement by the parties to the
contrary. This broad statement as to the recoverability of the cost of reasonable mitigation efforts
must also be qualified with regard to cases arising under Article 2 of the U.C.C., where the
classification of specific mitigation expenditures by an injured seller as being "incidental" or instead
"consequential" damages can be determinative of whether they are recoverable. U.C.C. § 2-710
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017). Consequential damages are specifically granted to
buyers of goods under U.C.C. § 2-715. Id. § 2-715(b). The comparable section 2-710 provision that
is applicable to sellers, however, refers only to incidental damages and not to consequential
damages. Id. § 2-710. Moreover, subsection 1-305(a) states that consequential damages are not
available under the U.C.C. unless they are specifically provided for. Id. § 17305(a). As a result,
courts have generally concluded that sellers of goods are not entitled to recover consequential
damages, and mitigation expenditures by injured sellers would therefore have to be categorized as
"incidental" losses to be recoverable. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 7.3, at 215 & n.2 (3d ed. 1993). Professors White and Summers are highly
critical of this result, however, and believe that courts can and should interpret the U.C.C.
provisions to allow sellers as well as buyers of goods to obtain consequential damages as well as
incidental damages. See id. § 7.4, at 215-16.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347(b) cmt. c. Again, this is in the absence of
contractual agreement to the contrary. But see id. (regarding seller damages under the U.C.C., where
the classification of the costs of attempted mitigation efforts as "incidental" damages or instead as
"consequential" damages may be significant).
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There is another and more subtle question related to the mitigation
of damages, however, for which the answer is unfortunately not quite so
clear. If a person injured by the breach of a contract is in a position to
reasonably mitigate damages, but does not do so, that person as noted
above will not be able to recover the damages that could have been so
avoided. 4 But under those circumstances, will that person nevertheless
still be able to recover the probable costs of those reasonable mitigation
efforts had they been undertaken,5 even though the person did not
actually incur those costs? In other words, should the penalty for a
person that does not take reasonable steps to mitigate her damages be the
loss of the right to recover all of the damages that could have been so
avoided, without any offset of the probable costs that such mitigation
efforts would entail6 from this reduction in her award? Or should the
party only lose the right to recover the net reduction of damages that
could have been achieved by those mitigation efforts, after offsetting the
probable costs of those efforts from the reduction in damages that would
have resulted?
Let me try to clarify the scope of this question with a simple
illustration. Consider the situation that arises if a person can mitigate her
losses from a breach of contract by $10,000 by taking reasonable
mitigation measures that would probably cost only about $500. If she
takes those measures, so that her damages are thereby reduced by
$10,000, she will then be able to recover her remaining damages,
including as an element of incidental damages the $500 cost of those
mitigation efforts. But what if that person does not take those mitigation
efforts, and her losses are consequently $10,000 greater than they might
have been? Should one's recovery then be reduced by the full $10,000 of
avoidable losses as a result of one's failure to take those reasonable
mitigation efforts, or instead only by the $9500 net savings that would
have resulted from the mitigation efforts once the $500 probable costs of
mitigation are also taken into account and offset? In this brief Article, I
will consider this narrow and seemingly simple but actually rather
difficult question.7
Let me preface my analysis by making clear my views as to the
proper resolution of this question, as a matter of policy. I believe that

4. Id. § 350(1).
5. I use the phrase "probable costs" throughout this Article to refer to mitigation costs
that were not actually incurred, since the precise magnitude of what those costs would have
been, had they been incurred, is necessarily at least somewhat uncertain since they have not been
actually incurred.
6. See id. § 350 cmt. b.
7. See infra Parts 1-IV.
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courts should not reduce the damages that they assess against a party
who breaches a contract, when the injured party fails to reasonably
mitigate, by any more than is necessary to uphold the basic avoidability
of damages principle. I also believe, however, that courts should also
attempt to provide sufficient incentive for future injured parties to
behave efficiently after breach. These two goals could both be
accomplished by courts reducing the recovery of an injured person who
fails to mitigate by only the net reduction in damages that would have
resulted had reasonable mitigation efforts been undertaken. They should
offset from the reduction in damages that they impose to deny recovery
for losses, that could have been avoided through reasonable mitigation
efforts, the probable costs that would have been incurred in carrying out
those mitigation efforts.
Such a result would be fair to the contract breacher in that it would
prevent him from obtaining an undeserved windfall reduction in his
damages when the injured party fails to make reasonable mitigation
efforts, as compared to the compensatory damages that he would be
obligated to pay had reasonable mitigation efforts been undertaken and
the losses caused by the breach thereby reduced, and the cost of
mitigation then included in the recovery as an incidental cost of the
breach. In addition, an injured person who fails to make reasonable
efforts to mitigate damages would be denied only the recovery of the net
amount of damages that could have been avoided through those
mitigation efforts, once the probable cost of those efforts is taken into
account and offset, an appropriate result since that is how much those
mitigation efforts would have saved.
Reducing the recovery of an injured person who fails to mitigate by
only the net rather than the gross reduction in damages that would have
resulted from mitigation efforts, had they been undertaken, is also
relatively efficient in that it would preserve (although concededly would
slightly weaken) the economic incentive for persons to mitigate damages
whenever it is cost-effective for them to do so. Even with this smaller
reduction in her recovery, a person would still be better off if she made
reasonable efforts to mitigate damages than if she did not. Cost-effective
mitigation efforts would still be encouraged.
I find convincing on both fairness and efficiency grounds these
arguments for reducing the damages awarded to a person who fails to
take reasonable efforts to mitigate by only the net rather than the gross
reduction in damages that would probably result from the mitigation
efforts. However, this position is not unassailable and reasonable
persons might disagree with my conclusions. It is possible to envision a
court first denying recovery of those damages that could have been
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avoided through reasonable mitigation efforts that were not undertaken,
applying standard avoidability principles to reach this result, and then
also denying recovery of the probable cost of those mitigation efforts as
an offset to that reduction in damages.
A court might reach this seemingly harsh result--one that appears
to both undercompensate the injured person that fails to mitigate and
also confer an undeserved windfall reduction in damages to the contract
breacher--on one or more of several possible bases. First of all, since
those probable mitigation costs were not actually incurred by the injured
person, a court might rather simplistically conclude on that basis alone
that those costs are not losses that merit recovery, even if only as an
offset against a larger damages reduction that would be imposed due to
the failure to reasonably mitigate. While there is some support to be
found in contract law generally for awarding damages under
circumstances when no out-of-pocket losses have been incurred,8 courts
in most contracts cases are only called upon to award damages where
actual losses can be proven, 9 and may therefore be uncomfortable with
the somewhat counterintuitive concept of ordering reimbursement of
expenses that were not actually incurred.
Second, those probable mitigation costs, since they were not
actually incurred, are only estimated costs. Such estimates may, under
some circumstances, not be reasonably certain in their magnitude, and an
injured person perhaps may be denied recovery by a court for that reason
alone. Now the costs of mitigating damages, particularly the costs of
typical covering purchases or subsequent resales, or of short-term
financing-type arrangements entered into to offset temporary cash
shortfalls after breach, can often be established with a fair degree of
precision, and will not pose the same significant uncertainty problems as
do, for example, claims based upon lost future profits or foregone
opportunities. However, probable mitigation expenses that were not
incurred are inherently less certain in amount than are actually
incurred expenses, and in some instances their magnitude may pose
substantial questions that a court would deem sufficient to justify
denying their recovery.
Third, allowing such an offset from the reduction of damages for
failure to mitigate will concededly undercut, to some extent, the
incentive for future contracting parties to take reasonable efforts to
8. Consider, for example, the right to recover the value of adequately proven foregone
opportunities as part of a reliance interest-based contract damages award, or to recover adequately
proven probable lost future profits as part of an expectation interest-based award.
9.

James P. Nehf, Contract Damages as a Substitutefor Full Performance, 32 IND. L. REV.

765, 770 (1999).
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mitigate damages in the event of breach, since if such an offset is
allowed then the penalty for failure to mitigate is reduced to that extent.
This reduction in the incentive to mitigate may give some courts
concern. However, mitigation efforts are generally regarded as being
"reasonable" efforts for avoidability of damages purposes only in
instances where the magnitude of the avoidable losses substantially
exceeds the costs of mitigation. Under those circumstances, even if the
probable costs of mitigation are offset against the much larger damages
reduction that will be imposed for the failure to mitigate the injured
person would still have been far better off had she undertaken those
mitigation efforts and avoided those larger damages. The allowance of
this relatively minor recovery of the probable costs of mitigation efforts
that were not undertaken would still leave in place a sufficiently strong
incentive to take all clearly cost-effective mitigation efforts.
Despite the problems that I have pointed out with each of these
bases for denying recovery of probable mitigation costs that were not
incurred, a court may for one or more of those reasons decide that it is
better policy to reduce the recovery of an injured person who has failed
to take reasonable mitigation efforts by the full amount of damages
avoidable through those mitigation efforts, rather than by the smaller net
amount of damages reduction that would have occurred had those
mitigation efforts taken place and the probable costs of those mitigation
efforts then been offset from those avoidable losses.
I have discussed some of the relevant policy considerations and
offered my opinion as to the better result, but what is the actual state of
the law? There is surprisingly little authority to be found that addresses
this question. Several major single-volume contract law treatises that I
have reviewed all closely agree on the general framework of mitigation
of damages law, as one would expect, but none of them address this
particular question regarding the right to recover probable mitigation
costs that were not incurred, nor cite any precedents or statutes that
would apply to these circumstances.10 Moreover, those treatises in their
rather brief discussions of mitigation issues do not always distinguish
between the application of avoidability principles to sale of goods
contracts and to other contracts not governed by U.C.C. Article 2-a
distinction which could arguably be significant in this context given the
different treatment of seller consequential damages under U.C.C. Article
2 as compared to common law.

10. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.12, at 778 (4th ed. 2004); JOHN EDWARD
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 123(A)-(C), at 777-80 (5th ed. 2011); JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS §§ 14.15-. 17, at 506-11 (6th ed. 2009).
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In addition, these several treatise discussions all overlook what may
be an important distinction between what I describe as the "primary"
mitigation efforts that a person may undertake to directly reduce the
amount of damages that she will suffer from a breach, and that person's
possible "secondary" mitigation efforts to obtain external financing of
any cash shortfall resulting from the breach that may persist even after
those primary damages mitigation efforts have been undertaken, until
settlement compensation or a judgment award is paid." Such secondary
mitigation efforts may be undertaken so as to avoid the risk of further
consequential losses that might result from that shortfall. Such
consequential losses may result, for example, from defaults by the
injured person upon other obligations that take place because of the
financial constraints imposed by the shortfall, or from consequent
financial restrictions on the ability to pursue other profitable
opportunities, until a settlement payment or damages award is received
from the contract breacher. As I will discuss below, a court may choose
to deal differently between primary and secondary mitigation efforts
with regard to allowing recovery of probable mitigation costs when
those mitigation efforts are not undertaken.12
Nor do any of these treatises consider the possible significance of
applicable prejudgment interest statutes for the right to recover the
probable costs of such secondary mitigation financial arrangements that
are not undertaken. As I will discuss below, prejudgment interest statutes
may well be regarded by some courts as having some bearing on the
scope of recovery rights, both for the recovery of costs incurred for
secondary mitigation measures, and for the probable costs of secondary
mitigation measures that are not undertaken.13
In Part II of this Article, I more fully elaborate on this distinction
between primary and secondary efforts to mitigate damages,14 and on the
potential significance of prejudgment interest statutes on the right to
recover the probable costs of secondary mitigation efforts that are not
undertaken.15 Having developed this analytical framework, in Part HI, I
address the question of the right of a person who fails to take reasonable
efforts to mitigate her damages, after the breach of a sale of goods
contract that is governed by state statutes implementing U.C.C.
Article 2, to recover the probable costs of those mitigation efforts.16
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra Partl.A.
See infra Part 1H.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part H.A.
See infra Part l.B.
See infta Part 1l.
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I will separately consider the circumstances of seller breach and buyer
breach of such sale contracts, and with regard to primary and secondary
mitigation efforts, 17 and will also take into account the effect of
prejudgment interest statutes. 18 In Part IV, I address these same
questions with regard to those contracts not governed by U.C.C.
Article 2, using the applicable provisions of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts as a general articulation of the governing common law
2
principles. 9 Part V presents a brief overall conclusion. 1
II. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MITIGATION EFFORTS, AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST STATUTES FOR RECOVERY
OF THE PROBABLE COST OF SECONDARY MITIGATION EFFORTS
THAT ARE NOT UNDERTAKEN

A.

"Primary" and "Secondary" Mitigation Efforts Defined

Consider the circumstances of a person who has contracted to buy
goods or services when the seller then breaches by failing to deliver the
goods or services involved. Often the injured buyer can then reduce the
damages that would result from not having the contracted-for goods or
services simply by "covering" by purchasing those same or very similar
goods or services from an alternative supplier, usually at a cost
somewhat higher than the original contract price.2 1 Such a covering

purchase would avoid altogether the damages resulting from not having
the goods or services.2 2 If the extra cost of cover is substantially less
than those damages thereby avoided, then covering would be regarded as
a reasonable mitigation effort, and a failure to cover could be a basis for
3
denying recovery of those damages that could have been so avoided. 2
Such a reasonable covering purchase would be an example of what
I will call a "primary" mitigation effort. The extra cost of cover and the
transaction costs incurred to arrange a covering purchase would each
generally be recoverable as an element of incidental damages, absent
contractual agreement to the contrary. These extra costs could, however,
under some circumstances be substantial enough in amount to cause a
cash shortfall for the injured person during the perhaps extended time
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra Part II.A-B.
See infra notes 58-60, 92-94 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See U.C.C. § 2-712(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
Id.§ 2-715(2)(a).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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period that may elapse prior to that person receiving reimbursement of
those mitigation costs. This could then possibly lead to further
consequential losses due to, for example, defaults on other obligations,
or the inability to pursue other profitable opportunities. If a person
obtains external financing of those extra costs of a covering purchase
until reimbursement in order to avoid the risk of incurring these larger
consequential losses, this would be an example of what I call a
"secondary" mitigation of damages effort. This secondary mitigation
effort would of course impose a cost on the injured person in transaction
costs and later interest payments.
A person who has contracted to sell goods or services is in a
precisely analogous position if the buyer breaches by non-payment. As a
reasonable "primary" effort to mitigate her damages, the person could
then resell the goods or services for whatever they would bring in the
market. The difference between the original contract price and the
usually lower resale price, and the extra transaction costs of arranging
such a resale, would again generally be recoverable as elements of
incidental damages, absent contractual agreement otherwise. The
shortfall between the original contract price and the often lower net
resale price (after subtracting any additional transaction costs that are
incurred in connection with the resale) may again, under some
circumstances, be substantial enough to cause significant financial
difficulties for the injured person during the time period prior to
receiving reimbursement of that shortfall. This shortfall could again lead
to further consequential losses for the seller by forcing it to default on
other obligations, or by making it necessary to forego other profitable
opportunities. If the injured seller obtains external financing of that
shortfall for that time period in order to avoid the risk of these larger
consequential losses, that financing arrangement would again be an
example of a "secondary" mitigation of damages effort, undertaken at a
cost to the seller of arranging that financing and then making the
required principal and interest payments.
As I will discuss below, neither U.C.C. Article 2 nor the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts is entirely clear regarding whether a
person who could reasonably mitigate the risk of consequential damages
through secondary, external financing-type mitigation efforts, but
does not do so, will be able to recover the probable costs of such
financing arrangements.24

24.

See infra Parts II IV.
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B. Secondary Mitigation Costs andPrejudgmentInterest Statutes
For some contract breaches there are applicable statutes in force
that provide for prejudgment interest to be awarded, at a specified
interest rate, for the time period between the breach and the later
issuance of the judgment. Such prejudgment interest awards are
intended primarily to compensate the injured party for being denied
recovery between the time of injury and the later award ofjudgment, for
the loss of the time value of money and opportunities to invest that
money over that period.26 But a person who has obtained external
financing of the amount of that recovery for the time period prior to the
award of judgment, arranged in order to avoid the risk of consequential
losses from that shortfall, has not been denied the use of those funds. If a
person who has made such secondary mitigating financial arrangements
to avoid the risk of consequential losses is then able to obtain recovery
of the costs of this mitigation effort, where she is also able to recover
statutory prejudgment interest on her damage award that is primarily
designed to compensate for exactly these kinds of costs, it can be argued
that this kind of recovery would be duplicative. As will be discussed
below, this complication resulting from the existence of prejudgment
interest statutes will also need to be considered when one is analyzing
whether an injured party that does not arrange such secondary mitigation
financing in order to avoid the risk of consequential losses should still be
able to recover the probable costs of such financing.27
Having discussed the policy considerations that are applicable to
this question of the recovery of probable mitigation costs that were not
incurred, and having set out some general analytical categories and
complications, let me turn now to a more specific analysis of the current
state of the law. I will first consider the right of an injured person to
recover the probable costs of reasonable efforts to mitigate damages,
after the breach of a sale of goods contract that is governed by U.C.C.
Article 2, when that person fails to make reasonable primary efforts to
mitigate damages, or does so but then fails to take reasonable secondary
mitigation efforts to avoid the risk of consequential losses resulting from
the remaining damages that were not reasonably avoidable by primary
mitigation measures.28 I will then consider this question with regard to
25. For an extensive discussion of prejudgment interest statutes, see generally Michael S.
Knoll, A Primer on PrejudgmentInterest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293 (1996).
26. Id. at 302 ("Prejudgment interest is assessed in order to place the parties in the same
position they would have been in had the defendant paid the plaintiff an amount equal to the original
judgment when the injury occurred.").
27. See infra Part III.A.2, B.2.
28. See infra Part 11.
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contracts that would instead be governed by general common law
principles as articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.29
I1.

RECOVERY OF THE PROBABLE COSTS OF MITIGATION OF
DAMAGES UNDER U.C.C. ARTICLE 2 WHEN ONE HAS
FAILED TO MITIGATE

The U.C.C. is not entirely clear regarding whether a person that is
injured by the breach of a sale of goods contract has a right to recover
probable mitigation of damages costs that were not actually incurred,
either directly or as an offset against the reduction in damages that will
be imposed for the failure to take reasonable efforts to mitigate. Let me
first address how U.C.C. Article 2 applies under these circumstances to
the common situation where a seller has breached a sale of goods
contract by failure to deliver, 30 and then I will address how it applies
under these circumstances to the equally common situation where a
buyer of goods has breached the contract by failing to make payment
when due.3'
A.

Seller Breach by Non-Delivery

When a seller fails to deliver goods, the usual primary mitigation
action that is available to the injured buyer to reduce her damages from
the breach is to cover by purchasing substitute goods from another seller,
usually at a higher price.32 The U.C.C. implements the general principle
of denying recovery of reasonably avoidable damages at subsection
2-715(2)(a) where it limits the consequential damages that a buyer may
obtain to "any loss.. . which could not reasonably be prevented by
cover or otherwise."33 A buyer who covers after the seller's breach will,
under subsection 2-712(2), be able to recover the difference between the
cost of cover and the original contract price.34 The buyer under that
provision will also be able to recover the transaction costs of arranging
cover as incidental damages,3 5 which are defined at subsection 2-715(1)
to include the costs "incurred" or other "expenses ... in connection with
effecting cover,"3 6 and also any consequential loss under subsection

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part h1I.A.
See infra Part UI.B.
See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
Id. § 2-712(2).
Id.
Id. § 2-715(1).
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2-715(2)(a) that could not be reasonably prevented by cover
or otherwise.3 7
Let me first consider the question presented by a buyer who after a
seller breach by non-delivery fails to engage in the primary mitigation
action of entering into a covering transaction.18 Can that buyer recover
as an offset from her damages reduction for failure to mitigate the
probable extra costs of cover? These costs would include both the extra
amount that would have to be paid for the substitute goods over and
above the original contract price as well as any transaction costs that
would be incurred in arranging a substitute transaction. I will then
consider the question of the right of a buyer who does cover as a primary
mitigation measure, but who then fails to engage in the secondary
mitigation action of arranging financing of the resulting cash shortfall
after covering so as to avoid possible further consequential losses, to
recover the probable costs of such a financing arrangement.3 9
1. Failure to Engage in the Primary Mitigation Effort of Covering
After a Seller Breach by Non-Delivery
At subsection 2-712(3) and the associated Official Comment 3 to
that subsection, the U.C.C. makes clear that a failure to cover by the
buyer after a seller breaches the contract by non-delivery is not a bar to
the buyer obtaining a remedy.4 ° The buyer may choose to not make a
substitute covering purchase,41 and may under subsection 2-713(1) still
recover the difference between the market price of the goods at the time
the buyer learned of the breach (i.e., the cost of covering by a substitute
purchase had cover been undertaken) and the (usually lower) contract
price.42 In other words, if the buyer fails to cover when doing so would
have been a reasonable measure to mitigate the larger damages that
would otherwise result from seller non-delivery, under the standard
principle of denying recovery of reasonably avoidable damages that is
embodied by subsection 2-715(2)(a), the buyer will be denied recovery
of those consequential damages that could have been avoided by a
covering transaction.43 The buyer will instead be awarded only the extra
cost of cover that would have to have been paid for the substitute goods
over and above the original contract price.

37.

Id. §§ 2-712(2), 2-715(2)(a).

38.

See infra Part III.A. 1.

39. See infra Part Im.A.2.
40. U.C.C. § 2-712(3) & cmt. 3.
41. Id. § 2-712 cmt. 3.
42.

Id. § 2-713(1).

43. Id. § 2-715(2)(a) & cmt. 2.
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However, whether a buyer who chooses not to cover will under
subsection 2-713(1) and section 2-715 also be allowed to recover the
probable transaction costs of arranging a covering purchase, costs that
were not actually incurred, is more problematic. Under subsection
2-713(1) a buyer who fails to cover after a seller breach by non-delivery
will also be able to recover any incidental damages or consequential
damages that are allowable under section 2-715.' However, it is
unlikely that the probable transaction costs of arranging a covering
transaction, if the buyer chooses not to cover and therefore to not
actually incur those costs, would qualify under subsection 2-715(1) as
recoverable incidental damages, given that provision's textual limitation
of incidental damages to "incurred" expenses.45
A more promising argument for recovery would be that those
probable transaction costs of a covering purchase, although not incurred,
would still qualify as a "loss" under subsection 2-715(2)(a), and should
therefore still be recoverable as an offset from the reduction in
consequential damages imposed due to the failure to mitigate.4 6 The
argument would be that those probable transaction costs, though not
actually incurred, should nevertheless be regarded as a "loss" in
economic terms because they could not be avoided except by incurring
the even larger losses resulting from failure to cover. Another way to
look at the situation is to note that a person who fails to mitigate
damages has in effect elected to bear a larger avoidable damages loss,
rather than the smaller cost of mitigation efforts, but necessarily must
bear at least the smaller cost. So, one has no choice but to bear at least
the "loss" of one's probable mitigation costs.
If those probable mitigation costs are regarded as qualifying
as a "loss," they are clearly a loss that is recoverable under subsection
2-715(2)(a) because they "could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise,' 4 since a covering purchase to avoid larger consequential
damages would necessarily require incurring the transaction costs of
cover.4 8 Only the remaining consequential damages that would result
from not having the goods, net of the probable transaction costs of
covering, could be reasonably prevented by cover, so therefore only
that portion of the consequential damages should be denied recovery
for failure to mitigate. The probable transaction costs of cover that

44. Id. § 2-713(1).
45. See id. § 2-715(1).
46. Id.§ 2-715(2)(a) & cmt. 2.
47. Id. § 2-715(2)(a).
48. See id. § 2-715 cmt. 1.
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were not incurred should be offset from the overall reduction of
consequential damages.
In summary, I think the fairest result here that is consistent with the
rather restrictive statutory language of section 2-715 would be to first
concede that the probable transaction costs of cover that were not
incurred by an injured buyer do not qualify as recoverable incidental
damages under the literal text of subsection 2-715(1). 49 But one should
then conclude that those costs are nevertheless a recoverable loss under
subsection 2-715(2)(a) as an offset against the reduction in damages for
failure to mitigate, since they are consequential losses that could not
reasonably be prevented without incurring larger losses.5" This latter
conclusion is based on the point noted above that, first of all, a covering
purchase would obviously lead to the injured buyer incurring those
transaction costs, and, second, not covering would lead to the injured
buyer thereby bearing even larger uncompensated consequential losses
than those transaction costs. Bearing those larger consequential losses is
thus not a reasonable means of avoiding those probable transaction costs
under subsection 2-715(2)(a).
2. Failure to Engage in the Secondary Mitigation Effort of
Financing the Cash Shortfall Resulting from the
Combination of a Seller Breach by Non-Delivery
and a Subsequent Covering Purchase
A buyer that covers with a substitute purchase after a seller breach
by non-delivery may then also as a further secondary mitigation of
damages effort choose to arrange external financing of the extra costs of
cover, including both the extra amount paid over and above the contract
price for the substitute goods and the transaction costs of arranging the
covering purchase, in order to avoid the risk of consequential damages
from the cash shortfall caused by these extra costs until they are later
reimbursed. The transaction and interest payment costs of such financing
would presumably be recoverable under subsection 2-712(2) and section
2-715.51 Although there is a split of judicial authority regarding whether
such secondary mitigation costs should be regarded as incidental
damages or instead as consequential damages,52 this is a matter of no

49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. § 2-715(1).
See id. § 2-715(2)(a) & cmt. 2.
Id. § 2-712(2)(a).
See WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, §§ 7-3 to -4, at 214-16 (noting the split ofjudicial

authority on whether the interest costs of substitute funding to avoid cash flow difficulties that is
necessitated by a buyer's breach should be regarded as recoverable incidental damages under
U.C.C. section 2-710, or instead as non-recoverable consequential damages).
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import in the context of a seller breach since for buyers both forms of
damages are recoverable under section 2-715.1 3
But what if a buyer engages in the primary mitigation effort of
covering by making a substitute purchase after a seller breach by nondelivery, but then fails to engage in further reasonable secondary
mitigation of damages efforts to temporarily finance the resulting extra
payment and transaction costs of covering, and as a result risks suffering
later consequential losses of one sort or another that could have been
reasonably avoided by making those financing arrangements? Such a
buyer under subsection 2-715(2)(a) will probably be denied any
resulting consequential losses that could have been reasonably avoided
"by cover or otherwise," with the financing arrangement that was not
undertaken being regarded as an "otherwise" reasonable means of
avoidance of those consequential losses.5 4 But will the buyer then be
able to recover the probable transaction and interest payment costs of
that financing effort that was not undertaken?
Once again, the questions will arise as to whether probable
mitigation costs that are not actually expended would qualify as
"incurred" incidental damages under subsection 2-715(l), 5' and if not
whether those costs would then qualify under subsection 2-715(2)(a) as
consequential losses that could not be reasonably prevented.56 I would
again argue that the fairest result that is consistent with the restrictive
Article 2 statutory language would be to regard those probable financing
costs as recoverable consequential losses that were not reasonably
avoidable, since their avoidance by eschewing such financing
arrangements would lead to an unacceptable risk of even larger
consequential losses.
Under the U.C.C., as well as at common law, damages are not
57
recoverable if their amount cannot be proven with reasonable certainty.
That being said, a court considering whether to allow recovery of the
probable costs of financing a cash shortfall that remains after primary
mitigation measures have been taken, but where that secondary
mitigation financing effort was not undertaken, is not likely to be unduly
troubled by the uncertainty as to the magnitude of those probable costs.
This is because the costs of such short-term financing arrangements for a
particular person are likely to be fairly easy to determine with a fair
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
1981).

U.C.C. § 2-715(1)-(2).
Id. § 2-715(2)(a).
Id. § 2-715(1).
See id. § 2 -715(2)(a).
Id. § 1-305 cmt. 1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. LAW INST.
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degree of precision. The greater uncertainty that is presented under these
circumstances will typically be whether the probability and magnitude of
the various consequential losses that may result from the cash shortfall
remaining after the primary mitigation efforts have been undertaken are
sufficiently great so as to reasonably justify such secondary mitigation
financing efforts in order to avoid those risks. But this question goes to
the reasonableness of those secondary mitigation efforts, not to the
question addressed in this Article of whether the probable cost of
reasonable secondary mitigation efforts that are not undertaken are
recoverable either directly or as an offset to the denial of any resulting
consequential damages.
The existence of any applicable prejudgment interest statutes may,
however, create some additional complications. The import of
prejudgment interest statutes for the other items of a recovery for breach
of contract are not explicitly addressed by the U.C.C., except to the
extent that the general endorsement of the expectation damages principle
in section 1-305 suggests that supra-compensatory duplicative recoveries
should not be allowed.58 Where a prejudgment interest statute applies, a
court may regard the recovery of reasonable secondary mitigation
financing costs that have been incurred by the injured person as being
duplicative of that statutory recovery, particularly if the applicable
statutory interest rate is high enough to cover the full transaction and
interest payment costs of such financing, and therefore deny that
recovery. 59 And under those circumstances where such reasonable
secondary mitigation efforts were not made-the focus of this Articlecourts under subsection 2-715(2)(a) would first deny recovery of any
consequential losses that could have been avoided by such efforts, and
then would require that the prejudgment interest award be calculated
only on the basis of the smaller allowable recovery.6" But under those
circumstances as well, some courts may disallow recovery of the
probable transaction and interest payment costs of such financing
arrangements that were not made, again on the basis that such a recovery
would be duplicative of the award obtained under the prejudgment
interest provisions.
3. Summary
In brief summary, the language of U.C.C. Article 2 leaves open the
argument as to whether a buyer who fails to reasonably cover by making

58.
59.
60.

See U.C.C. § 1-305(a).
See supra Part I.B.
See U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) & cmt. 2.
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a substitute purchase after a seller breach by non-delivery may still
recover the probable transaction costs of arranging a covering
transaction as an offset to her reduction in damages for the failure to
cover. It is also unclear whether a buyer who engages in primary
mitigation efforts by entering into a covering purchase after a seller
breach by non-delivery, but who then fails to arrange for reasonable
financing of any resulting temporary cash shortfall to avoid possible
consequential losses that may result from that shortfall, may still recover
the probable costs of arranging such financing, either directly or as an
offset to disallowed consequential damages.
Finally, the existence of applicable prejudgment interest statutes
may influence some courts that might otherwise be inclined to allow
recovery of probable secondary mitigation costs that were not incurred
to now disallow recovery of those probable costs as duplicative. This
result is strongly suggested but does not appear to be compelled by the
applicable U.C.C. provisions.
B. Buyer Breach by Non-Payment
While under U.C.C. Article 2 buyers of goods are entitled to
consequential damages resulting from a breach by the seller, subject to
foreseeability and avoidability limitations, 6' sellers are generally not
allowed to recover consequential damages resulting from a buyer's
breach.6 2 The typical breach of a sale of goods contract by a buyer would
be by non-payment when payment is due, and the typical reasonable
primary mitigation measure available to an injured seller who faces
potential consequential damages from being denied receipt of those
funds would be to first resell the goods for what they would bring in the
market.63 Then, if necessary to meet any significant remaining cash
shortfall resulting from the buyer's non-payment exceeding those net
resale proceeds, after deducting the transaction costs of the resale, and
which shortfall risks causing further consequential losses, a seller may
also elect to pursue the secondary mitigation effort of seeking to borrow
substitute funds to cover that shortfall until a settlement payment is
made or a judgment is awarded.
Let me first consider the question of a seller's right to recover the
probable transaction costs of reselling the goods after a buyer's breach

61.
62.
63.

Id. § 2-715(2)(a).
See supranote 2.
U.C.C. § 2-703(d); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmts. b-c (AM. LAW

INST. 1981).
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by non-payment, if that seller elects not to resell the goods.64 I then turn
to the question raised by a seller who does resell the goods after a
buyer's breach as a primary mitigation effort, but who then fails to
engage in reasonable secondary mitigation efforts to finance the
resulting cash shortfall after the resale so as to avoid the risk of
consequential damages resulting from that shortfall.65
1. Failure to Engage in the Primary Mitigation Effort of Reselling
the Goods After a Buyer's Breach by Non-Payment
If a seller does resell the goods after a buyer's breach by nonpayment then under subsection 2-706(1), the seller can recover the
difference between the unpaid contract price and the (usually lower)
66
resale price, along with the transaction costs of conducting the resale,
which are regarded as being recoverable "incidental damages" under
section 2-710.67 This is all subject to an. exception not relevant here for
lost-volume sellers. 68 But what if the seller does not resell the goods
after the buyer's breach by non-payment? Under subsection 2-708(1) the
seller then can recover only the difference between the unpaid contract
price and the market price at the time and place of delivery, plus any
incidental damages. 69 Reflecting the application of the general principle
of denying the recovery of reasonably avoidable losses, subsection
2-706(1) thus denies the seller the recovery of that portion of the unpaid
contract price that could have been avoided through reasonable resale. 0
This is all clear enough, but do the probable transaction costs of
such a resale that did not take place nevertheless qualify under section
2-710 as recoverable "incidental damages" 71 that would provide an
offset against the reduction in damages for failure to mitigate by resale?
Probably not, since section 2-710 is similar in structure and language to
subsection 2-715(1) that defines incidental damages for buyers.72 The
64. See infra Part IIB.1.
65. See infra Part 11I.B.2.
66. U.C.C. § 2-706(1).
67. Id § 2-710.
68. See id. § 2-708(2).
69. Id. § 2-708(1).
70. Id. § 2-706 cmt. 2.
71. Id. § 2-710.
72. Compare id. ("Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation,
care and custody of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection with return or resale of the goods
or otherwise resulting from the breach."), with id. § 2-715(1) ("Incidental damages resulting from
the seller's breach include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation, and
care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or
commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the
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literal text of section 2-710 also limits those damages to costs
"incurred."73 This provision therefore would also likely be interpreted by
courts to not allow the probable transaction costs of arranging a resale
that were not actually incurred to be treated as incidental damages and
offset against the reduction in damages that is imposed by subsection
2-708(1) on avoidability grounds.74
As I have discussed above in the context of seller breach, 75 the
probable transaction costs of the injured buyer arranging a covering
transaction, if the buyer does not do so, may arguably qualify for an
offset against the reduction in consequential damages for failure to
mitigate imposed by subsection 2-715(2)(a), 76 because if transaction
costs were not "incurred," they do not qualify as recoverable incidental
damages under subsection 2-715(1).77 Transaction costs may qualify
under subsection 2-715(2)(a) as losses on the part of the buyer that are
not reasonably avoidable because they could be avoided at the cost of
even larger consequential losses. 78 However, this same interpretive
approach cannot be taken with regard to justifying seller recovery of the
transaction costs of resale if those costs are not incurred. This is because
the U.C.C. does not allow for seller recovery of consequential
damages.79 Since seller consequential damages are not allowed under
U.C.C. Article 2 there would a fortiori then be no reduction in the
seller's consequential damages for the seller's failure to mitigate through
resale, and as a result no basis for an offset of the probable transaction
costs of a resale that did not occur.
I think that as a matter of policy, a seller who does not resell the
goods after a buyer's breach should still be allowed to recover the
probable transaction costs of arranging for a resale, in a manner
analogous to allowing a buyer who does not cover to recover the
probable transaction costs of arranging a covering purchase as an offset
to her reduction in consequential damages. But unfortunately, I do not
see how that result can be reached under U.C.C. Article 2 given:
(1) the narrow U.C.C. section 2-710 definition of seller incidental

delay or other breach.").
73.
74.

Id.§ 2-710.
Id.; see id.§ 2-708(1).

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See supra Part ffl.A.
U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).
Id. § 2-715(1).
Id.§ 2-715(2)(a).
WHITE & SUMNMERS, supra note 2, § 7-6, at 218.
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damages,8" and (2) the disallowance altogether by the U.C.C. of seller
consequential damages.8"
2. Failure to Engage in the Secondary Mitigation Effort of
Financing the Cash Shortfall Resulting from the Combination
of a Buyer Breach and a Subsequent Resale Transaction
Now consider any financing that is actually arranged by a seller to
avoid the risk of later consequential damages by covering the remaining
financial shortfall that has resulted from a buyer's failure to meet her
payment obligations when due, after the receipt of the net proceeds from
resale of the goods. The transaction costs and interest payment
obligations incurred in obtaining such financing may or may not be
recoverable by the seller. This depends on whether the reviewing court
regards such mitigation financing costs as qualifying as "incidental
damages" under section 2-710,82 and there is a split of judicial authority
on the proper characterization of such financing costs.83 If a court
regards such secondary mitigation expenses as qualifying as incidental
damages under section 2-710 then they may be recoverable.84
But what if a seller does not actually arrange for such secondary
mitigation financing of cash shortfalls resulting from a buyer breach and
a subsequent lower-priced resale, and thereby suffers the risk of further
consequential losses stemming from the resulting shortfall? Even if
probable secondary mitigation costs are regarded as consequential
losses, they will not be recoverable simply because the U.C.C. does not
make seller consequential losses recoverable.85 And, as I have noted
above, it is unlikely that the probable costs that this secondary mitigation
financing would have involved, had it been arranged, would be
recoverable as incidental damages under section 2-710 since they were
not actually "incurred." 86 Even if those costs were recoverable under the
U.C.C., moreover, there would still be the problem noted above
regarding potential duplicative recovery given state statutes providing
for prejudgment interest.
In summary, if probable financing costs were regarded by a
reviewing court as incidental damages, a highly unlikely result given
that the language of section 2-710, like subsection 2-715(1), requires

80. See U.C.C. § 2-710.
81.

WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, § 7-6, at 218.

82. See U.C.C. § 2-710.
83. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 2, §§ 7-3 to -4, at 214-16.
84.

See U.C.C. § 2-710.

85. See id. § 2-715(2)(a).
86. See supra Part I]I.B.1.
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costs to be "incurred,"8 7 then the seller would be awarded the net costs
of such financing arrangements had they been reasonably undertaken in
order to avoid larger consequential losses. This result would parallel the
result discussed above for a buyer who fails to engage in secondary
mitigation of damages after a covering purchase by arranging temporary
financing of the extra costs of that purchase and the associated
transaction costs.88 But if those probable financing costs are instead
regarded as consequential damages in character-which seems much
more likely for the reasons discussed above with regard to buyer's
damages-then there would probably be a different result reached for
sellers than for buyers with regard to recovery of probable secondary
mitigation financing costs that are not incurred. This is an unfortunate
but seemingly unavoidable consequence of the different treatment of
consequential damages for buyers and for sellers under the U.C.C.
The fact that under the U.C.C. sellers cannot recover consequential
damages also undercuts one of the primary rationales that I have noted
above for allowing an injured person to recover probable mitigation
costs that were not incurred.89 As I have discussed, to not allow the
injured person to recover those probable costs as an offset against the
reduction in her damages for failure to mitigate would provide an unfair
windfall damages reduction to the breacher as compared to what he
would have had to pay had the mitigation efforts been undertaken and
the cost of those efforts recovered as additional incidental damages. But
since the U.C.C. does not award consequential damages to sellers of
goods, one could argue that the expenditures that were made by sellers
to mitigate consequential damages should not be charged to the buyer as
incidental damages. Since actual expenditures to avoid such damages
will not reduce the buyer's liability for the breach, neither should
expenditures that would have been incurred if the seller had made
reasonable efforts to mitigate.
In other words, if a court concludes that sellers should not be
allowed to recover their actual mitigation costs that are related to
avoidable consequential damages, damages that are not recoverable
under the U.C.C. in any event, then also disallowing the recovery of
probable mitigation costs that were not incurred would not put breaching
buyers in any better position than if the mitigation efforts had taken
place. In that event, the allowance of recovery of probable mitigation
costs cannot be justified on the basis of preventing unjustified windfalls

87. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
88. See supranote 54 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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to breaching buyers or unfairness to sellers, and would have to be
justified on some other basis.
As noted above in the context of secondary mitigation financing
arrangements made by buyers after a seller breach by non-delivery, 90 a
court considering whether to allow recovery of the probable costs of
financing a cash shortfall that remains after primary mitigation measures
have been taken, but where that secondary mitigation effort was not
undertaken, is not likely to be unduly troubled by uncertainty as to the
magnitude of those probable costs. The transaction and interest payment
costs of such short-term financing arrangements for a particular person
are likely to be fairly easy to determine with a fair degree of precision.
The greater uncertainty here, once again, will typically be whether the
probability and magnitude of the various consequential losses that may
result from the cash shortfall remaining after primary mitigation efforts
are sufficiently great to reasonably justify such secondary mitigation
financing efforts in order to avoid those risks. But this question once
again goes to the reasonableness of those secondary mitigation efforts,
not to the question here addressed in this Article of whether the probable
cost of reasonable secondary mitigation efforts that are not undertaken'
are recoverable.
The existence of an applicable prejudgment interest statute may
again create some additional complications. The import of such statutes
for other items of a recovery for breach of contract are, as I have noted,
not explicitly addressed by the U.C.C., 91 although the general
endorsement of the expectation damages principle in subsection 1-305(a)
suggests that supra-compensatory duplicative recoveries should not be
allowed. 92 Where a prejudgment interest statute applies, a court may
regard the recovery of reasonable secondary mitigation financing costs
that have been incurred as being largely duplicative of that statutory
recovery, particularly if the applicable statutory interest rate is high
enough to cover the full transaction and interest payment costs of such
financing, and deny that recovery. Under those circumstances where
such reasonable secondary mitigation efforts were not made, the focus of
this Article, courts under subsection 2-715(2)(a) 93 would first deny
recovery of any consequential damages that could have been avoided by
such efforts, and then would allow the prejudgment interest award to be
calculated only on the basis of the smaller allowable recovery. But they

90.
91.
92.
93.

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See U.C.C. § 1-305(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
Id. § 2-715(2)(a).
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may again choose to disallow recovery of the probable transaction and
interest payment costs of such financing arrangements, again on the
basis that such a recovery would be largely duplicative of the award
obtained under the prejudgment interest provisions.
3. Summary
In brief summary, U.C.C. Article 2 is unclear regarding whether a
seller who fails to reasonably resell the goods after a buyer breach by
non-payment may still recover the probable transaction costs of
arranging a resale transaction as an offset to her reduction in damages
for her failure to resell. It is also unclear whether a seller who engages in
primary mitigation efforts by entering into a resale transaction after a
buyer breach by non-payment, but who then fails to arrange financing of
any shortfall remaining after resale as a secondary mitigation measure in
order to avoid the risk of further consequential losses that may result
from that shortfall, may still recover the probable costs of arranging such
financing. The existence of applicable prejudgment interest statutes may
influence some courts that might be inclined to allow such a recovery of
probable mitigation costs to now disallow that recovery as duplicative.
This result is suggested, but does not appear to be compelled by the
applicable U.C.C. provisions.
I will not take a position in this Article regarding whether the
reasonable financing costs of secondary mitigation of the consequences
of cash shortfalls resulting from breach, if those costs are not incurred,
are properly regarded as "incidental" damages or instead as
"consequential" damages, although I think that the text of the applicable
provisions points strongly towards a consequential damages
characterization. I merely wish to point out that if those costs are
regarded as consequential rather than incidental damages they will then
be far more difficult for sellers to recover than buyers, a result that
seems difficult to justify as a matter of policy.
IV.

RECOVERY OF THE PROBABLE COST OF MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
AT COMMON LAW WHEN ONE HAS FAILED TO MITIGATE

Let me now briefly analyze the comparable questions presented by
attempts to recover primary or secondary probable mitigation costs that
were not incurred when those recovery attempts are governed by
common law principles rather than by U.C.C. provisions. For
expositional convenience, I will conduct this analysis applying only the
provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, although I
recognize that for any particular jurisdiction there may be statutes or
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judicial precedents in force that would alter those results for disputes
arising in that jurisdiction. Unlike my prior U.C.C. analysis, I will not
attempt to distinguish here between the situations facing buyers or
sellers of the services or other items involved in the contract.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts at subsection 350(1)
articulates the general avoidability of damages principle.94 However, it
does not specifically address whether an injured person who could
reasonably mitigate losses through primary mitigation measures, but
who fails to do so and therefore is denied recovery of the avoidable
portion of her damages, can still recover as an offset from the denied
recovery of the probable costs of mitigation that the person did not
actually incur. Official Comment b to section 350 states that when there
is a failure to mitigate damages then the "loss that [the injured party]
could reasonably have avoided.., is simply subtracted from the amount
that would otherwise have been recoverable as damages."9 5 That
Comment unfortunately once again does not make clear whether, by use
of the phrase "loss that.., could reasonably have avoided," the drafters
are referring to the gross amount of damages avoidable through
mitigation, or instead the smaller net amount of damages that could have
been avoided after offset of the probable cost of the mitigation effort
from the amount of avoidable damages. 96
There are several illustrations provided to section 350 that together
shed some further light on this question, but that unfortunately fail to
resolve the central issues presented. 97 Illustration 5, for example,
presents a sale of goods contract hypothetical demonstrating that a buyer
of goods who fails to take the reasonable step of covering after breach
will be denied the avoidable consequential damages, but may recover the
extra cost of the substitute purchase over and above the contract price
that such a covering transaction would have required. 98 It thus takes the
same position as does the U.C.C. at subsection 2-713(1) for seller
breaches by non-delivery, where a buyer who fails to cover after a seller
breach can still offset the extra costs of cover over and above the
contract price from the reduction in recovery. 99 That illustration, while
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("Except as
stated in Subsection (2), damages are not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have
avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation.").
95. Id.§ 350 cmt. b.
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., id.
cmts. b-c, illus. 1-8.
98. Id. cmt. c, illus. 5. The specific numbers used in the illustration are $25,000 in buyer
profits that were lost as a result of a failure to cover, with a covering purchase costing $11,000,
$1000 more than the original $10,000 contract price. Id.
99. U.C.C. § 2-713(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017); RESTATEMENT
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involving a sale of goods contract, does not attempt to specifically limit
this principle of allowing recovery of the extra cost of cover when the
buyer does not cover the sale of goods context, and therefore presumably
extends to comparable non-goods transactions.' 0 0 However, that
illustration is narrowly specified in that it only addresses the
recoverability of the extra cost that would have to be paid for substitute
goods, and not the additional transaction costs that would also be
incurred in arranging a substitute purchase."0 ' The central question
addressed in this Article-whether the transaction costs of a primary
mitigation cover purchase that are not incurred nevertheless qualify
for recovery and offset against any reduction in recovery for failure
to mitigate as either incidental or consequential damages-is
left unanswered.
At common law, of course, courts would not be constrained by the
relatively narrow limitation of incidental damages to actually incurred
expenses that is imposed by U.C.C. subsection 2-715(1), ° 2 but they still
may be reluctant to regard primary mitigation costs that were not
actually incurred as being recoverable incidental damages. Those courts
would still have the option that I have discussed above in the U.C.C.
Article 2 context of regarding the probable transaction costs of cover as
being consequential losses that are not reasonably avoidable, and thus
allow recovery of those costs as an offset against the reduction in
damages for failure to mitigate. 0 3
Illustration 7 presents another sale of goods hypothetical, this time
involving a buyer breach rather than a seller breach.104 This illustration
denies a seller who elects to not resell the goods after the breach the
right to recover the avoidable damages of the available market resale
price from the buyer, and only allows recovery of the smaller difference
between the contract price and the resale price, in a manner which
closely parallels the U.C.C. treatment of this situation under subsection
2-708(1).105 But that illustration also unfortunately does not address
whether a seller who elects to not resell the goods can still recover as

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. c, illus. 5.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. c, illus. 5.
101. Id.
102. U.C.C. § 2-715(1) & cmt. 2.
103. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. c, illus. 7.
105. U.C.C. § 2-708(1); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. c, illus. 7. The
specific numbers used in the illustration are the opportunity for the seller to resell the goods for
100.

$9000, $1000 less than the original contract price. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350

cmt. c, illus. 7.
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incidental or consequential damages the probable transaction costs that
1°6
would have been incurred to arrange a resale.
Illustration 6 to section 350 applies the same principle
demonstrated by illustration 5, that of allowing recovery of only the
extra cost of a covering transaction when the buyer fails to cover, more
broadly to a labor services contract that is outside the scope of the
U.C.C. 10 7 That illustration, however, again deals with a breach by the
seller in a narrow manner focusing only on the buyer's extra cost of
cover that closely parallels illustration 5, and so also does not shed light
on whether the probable transaction costs of covering for a buyer who
chooses not to cover after a seller breach are recoverable. 108
There are numerous additional illustrations provided for section
350,109 but none of those illustrations address the transaction cost
questions noted above, nor the more complicated situation of secondary
mitigation efforts that are not undertaken. Indeed, neither those
illustrations nor the reporter's note to section 350 provide any guidance
regarding the situation presented by a buyer (or seller) of goods or
services that, by entering into secondary mitigation financing
arrangements, could have reasonably avoided the risk of further
consequential damages.1 10 Nor do these provisions address consequential
damages resulting from cash shortfall problems caused by an excessive
cost of covering (or for a seller, by inadequate resale proceeds), after a
breach, by obtaining alternative financing of the shortfall as a secondary
mitigation measure.'11 Clearly a person who fails to arrange for such
financing should then be denied those avoidable consequential damages
if any of those risks come to fruition. But is that person then entitled to
offset the probable costs of such financing arrangements from this
reduction in damages, or even recover those probable financing costs if
no consequential damages later eventuate? The issue here at common
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. c, illus. 7.
107. Id. § 350 illus. 5-6. The specific numbers used in that illustration are that a substitute
employee could be hired by the buyer of services for $11,000, $1000 more than the contract price,
and that by failing to do so, the buyer's "crop is lost." Id. § 350 illus. 6. The reporter's note to
section 350 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts claims that illustration 6 is "based on"
illustration 1 of the Comment to section 336 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts. Id. § 350
reporter's note. There is indeed some similarity between the two illustrations, but the earlier
illustration in fact addresses only the matter of the denial of avoidable consequential damages, and
does not specifically address the narrower question here being considered of the recoverability of
probable mitigation expenses that were not actually incurred by the injured party. Id. § 350 illus. 6.
108. Id. § 350 illus. 6.
109. There are a total of twenty-three illustrations provided to that section. Id. § 350 cmts. b-h,
illus. 1-23.
110. Id. ; id. reporter's note.
111. Id.
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law is not complicated by the U.C.C.'s hazy distinction between
"incidental" and "consequential" damages, or by its restrictive definition
of "incidental" damages. 12 As a result these probable financing costs
may potentially be recoverable even if regarded as consequential
damages. But there is still no clear guidance provided by the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts on this question.
1 13
For the reasons discussed above in the U.C.C. Article 2 context,
courts at common law are also not likely to be unduly troubled by the
minor uncertainty presented by estimates of the probable costs of
secondary mitigation financing efforts, given the relative precision with
114
which such short-term financing costs can generally be established.
However, the existence of any applicable prejudgment interest statutes
will present the same issues discussed above in the U.C.C. Article 2
context as to the possibility of duplicative recoveries, both in instances
where secondary mitigation financing measures are undertaken and
when they are not.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has considered whether a person that fails to make
reasonable efforts to mitigate damages after a breach of contract will still
be able to offset against the reduction in her damages for failure to
mitigate the probable cost of those mitigation efforts that were not
undertaken. I first considered whether as a matter of policy such an
offset should be allowed so as to prevent both an undeserved windfall
damages reduction for the breacher, and undercompensation of the
injured party, given the potential difficulties allowance of such an offset
would create." 5 I then considered the current law applicable to this
question, first with regard to sale of goods contracts governed by U.C.C.
Article 2,116 and then with regard to other contracts governed primarily
by general common law principles as articulated in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts.'17
In my analysis I have drawn what I hope to be a useful distinction
between "primary" efforts to directly mitigate the damages resulting
from a contract breach, and "secondary" financing-type mitigation
efforts intended to avoid the risk of further consequential losses that may

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See U.C.C. § 2-715 (AM. LAW INST. & UNiT. LAW COMM'N 2017).
See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
See supra Part1.
See supra Part Il.
See supra Part IV.
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result from the cash shortfall caused by the remaining, non-avoidable
losses until they are reimbursed.1 18 I have also considered the possible
significance of the presence of applicable prejudgment interest statutes
for this question.119
I noted at the outset of this Article that I believe that on both
fairness and efficiency grounds the probable costs of either primary or
secondary mitigation efforts that are not undertaken by the injured
person should still as a matter of policy be recoverable as an offset
against any reduction in damages for failure to mitigate. 2 ' The policy
arguments against allowing such recovery concededly have some force,
but I do not regard them as sufficient to justify denying that recovery. As
a matter of law, there is some textual basis in the U.C.C. for allowing
recovery of the probable costs associated with both primary and
secondary mitigation efforts that are not undertaken, at least with respect
to buyer's consequential damages."2 I have concluded, however, that
beyond this circumstance both the U.C.C. and common law are unclear
as to whether recovery of probable mitigation costs that were not
actually expended should be allowed, particularly with regard to
secondary mitigation efforts that are not undertaken.1 22 There does
appear to be somewhat more latitude for courts allowing such recoveries
in cases governed by common law principles when they are not working
under the strictures of U.C.C. Article 2.
Given the balance of policies that I have discussed, courts applying
the U.C.C. or common law principles should in my opinion allow a
person who fails to reasonably mitigate damages to recover the probable
costs of those mitigation efforts even though those costs were not
incurred. I would hope that the courts could find a plausible rationale
consistent with applicable statutes and other law that would both clarify
this issue and enable them to reach the result that I favor, allowing a
,person to recover the probable costs of mitigation efforts even if those
costs are not incurred.
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